https://books.google.com/books?id=5xZFAQAAMAAJ&pg=PA341&lpg=PA341&dq=%22dauphin+island%22+slave&source=bl&ots=1XCWuABkRE&sig=Auyf-jc1TiaSyTxXLU1Br04wddk&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiGyP7jueHNAhUB6iYKHesDDwgQ6AEISTAI#v=onepage&q=%22dauphin%20island%22%20slave&f=false
“3. In the case of Jumonville de Williers, a citizen of Louisiana, the claim of indemnity for twenty slaves, carried away from Dauphin island, in the Bay of Mobile, does not appear to have been questioned by Mr. Jackson, upon the ground either of the sufficiency of the proof by which it was established, or the time of the transportation of the slaves; but to the allowance of the claim he objected, upon the pretence that Dauphin island was no part of the territory of the United States, but belonged to West Florida. , Mr. Cheves, declining to discuss our incontestable right to that island, derived from the cession of Louisiana, of which it constituted a part, offered to refer the difference between him and his associate, agreeably to the provisions of the fifth article of the convention; but Mr. Jackson, having erected himself into a judge of what belonged to us and what to Spain, decided that Dauphin island was not an appendage of Louisiana, but of West Florida, and therefore belonged to Spain at the period of the exchange of the ratifications of the treaty of Ghent, and refused to consent to the proposed reference. Dauphin island was, during the late war, reduced and occupied by the British arms as a part of the territory of the United States. Had it not been a part of their territory, the military occupation of it by Great Britain would have been an unprovoked act of war on her part against Spain, with whom she was then in peace. It was, on the return of peace, surrendered to the United States as a “territory, place, or possession’ (to use the language of the treaty of Ghent) taken from them during the war. Thus, in order to screen the British Government from the indemnity due to American citizens for one or two hundred negro slaves, Mr. Jackson would represent his nation as having committed an act of deliberate and wanton war upon the territories of a friendly and unoffending sovereign, and as having, after perpetrating that act of enormity, transferred the territory violently wrested from that sovereign to the United States, who had no right to it. The mere statement of the case, which truth compels me to make, must wound the sensibility of his Britannic Majesty's Government. If it were creditable to discuss the question of the right of the United States to Dauphin island, it would be easy to show that the Province of Louisiana, which was ceded to them on the 30th of April, 1803, extended as far east as the Perdido, and, of course, included the Bay of Mobile; that, prior to the late war with Great Britain, the United States had actually taken possession of the whole Province up to that limit; that they had incorporated the Bay of Mobile, including Dauphin island, in one of their territories, and governed it by their laws; and that the treaty with Spain of the 22d day of February, 1819, did not operate as an original cession, but only as a confirmation of their previous title, acquired under that with France, to the country lying between the Perdido and the island of New Orleans. It would have been a more compendious mode of disposing of this claim, on the part of Mr. Jackson, to have drawn in question our title to any part of Louisiana, as was done during the conferences at Ghent. He would then have gotten rid of the territory, the claimant, and his slaves. But the conclusive answer to his plea is to be found in the terms of the first article of the treaty of Ghent. They stipulate that “all territory, places, and possessions whatsoever taken by either party from the other during the war, or which may be taken after the signing of this treaty, excepting only the islands hereinafter mentioned, shall be restored without delay, and without causing any destruction, or carrying away any of the artillery or other public property originally captured in the said forts or places, and which shall remain therein upon the exchange of the ratifications of this treaty, or any slaves or other private property. Dauphin island was not one of those which were excepted from surrender. That article binds the high contracting parties to a mutual restoration of territory, places, and possessions, without regard to the consideration of title. The mere fact of possession prior to the war determined the duty of restoration on the return of peace. It was so intended, and well understood by both parties. Under that stipulation, as being one of the possessions taken from us during the war, the mouth of the Columbia has been restored, although our title to it was subsequently contested by Great Britain. And from none of the places or possessions thus to be restored was Great Britain to carry away any slave or other property. If this impeachment of our title to or possession of Dauphin island (for which, at an earlier period, Mr. Jackson might have been entitled to the grateful acknowledgments of Spain, but which, at this late day, will hardly be made) had been even colorable, the claim of D’Williers might have presented a fit subject of reference to the arbitrator of the convention. Incontestable as both title and possession were, Mr. Cheves, in consideration of what belonged to the character and dignity of his Government, would not have been without justification if he had declined an arbitration of the question had it been offered by the other Commissioner. In tendering it himself, you cannot fail to perceive manifested by him the greatest moderation and the strongest dispo sition faithfully to execute the fifth article of the convention. Nor can you avoid contrasting the conduct of the two Commissioners in this respect. Whilst Mr. Jackson refuses to refer, to say the least of it, the debatable question of interest, Mr. Cheves is willing to refer a case in which our clear and indisputable right to Dauphin island was the only point to be collaterally adjudicated.
http://www.cnrs-scrn.org/northern_mariner/vol22/tnm_22_361-392.pdf
“3. In the case of Jumonville de Williers, a citizen of Louisiana, the claim of indemnity for twenty slaves, carried away from Dauphin island, in the Bay of Mobile, does not appear to have been questioned by Mr. Jackson, upon the ground either of the sufficiency of the proof by which it was established, or the time of the transportation of the slaves; but to the allowance of the claim he objected, upon the pretence that Dauphin island was no part of the territory of the United States, but belonged to West Florida. , Mr. Cheves, declining to discuss our incontestable right to that island, derived from the cession of Louisiana, of which it constituted a part, offered to refer the difference between him and his associate, agreeably to the provisions of the fifth article of the convention; but Mr. Jackson, having erected himself into a judge of what belonged to us and what to Spain, decided that Dauphin island was not an appendage of Louisiana, but of West Florida, and therefore belonged to Spain at the period of the exchange of the ratifications of the treaty of Ghent, and refused to consent to the proposed reference. Dauphin island was, during the late war, reduced and occupied by the British arms as a part of the territory of the United States. Had it not been a part of their territory, the military occupation of it by Great Britain would have been an unprovoked act of war on her part against Spain, with whom she was then in peace. It was, on the return of peace, surrendered to the United States as a “territory, place, or possession’ (to use the language of the treaty of Ghent) taken from them during the war. Thus, in order to screen the British Government from the indemnity due to American citizens for one or two hundred negro slaves, Mr. Jackson would represent his nation as having committed an act of deliberate and wanton war upon the territories of a friendly and unoffending sovereign, and as having, after perpetrating that act of enormity, transferred the territory violently wrested from that sovereign to the United States, who had no right to it. The mere statement of the case, which truth compels me to make, must wound the sensibility of his Britannic Majesty's Government. If it were creditable to discuss the question of the right of the United States to Dauphin island, it would be easy to show that the Province of Louisiana, which was ceded to them on the 30th of April, 1803, extended as far east as the Perdido, and, of course, included the Bay of Mobile; that, prior to the late war with Great Britain, the United States had actually taken possession of the whole Province up to that limit; that they had incorporated the Bay of Mobile, including Dauphin island, in one of their territories, and governed it by their laws; and that the treaty with Spain of the 22d day of February, 1819, did not operate as an original cession, but only as a confirmation of their previous title, acquired under that with France, to the country lying between the Perdido and the island of New Orleans. It would have been a more compendious mode of disposing of this claim, on the part of Mr. Jackson, to have drawn in question our title to any part of Louisiana, as was done during the conferences at Ghent. He would then have gotten rid of the territory, the claimant, and his slaves. But the conclusive answer to his plea is to be found in the terms of the first article of the treaty of Ghent. They stipulate that “all territory, places, and possessions whatsoever taken by either party from the other during the war, or which may be taken after the signing of this treaty, excepting only the islands hereinafter mentioned, shall be restored without delay, and without causing any destruction, or carrying away any of the artillery or other public property originally captured in the said forts or places, and which shall remain therein upon the exchange of the ratifications of this treaty, or any slaves or other private property. Dauphin island was not one of those which were excepted from surrender. That article binds the high contracting parties to a mutual restoration of territory, places, and possessions, without regard to the consideration of title. The mere fact of possession prior to the war determined the duty of restoration on the return of peace. It was so intended, and well understood by both parties. Under that stipulation, as being one of the possessions taken from us during the war, the mouth of the Columbia has been restored, although our title to it was subsequently contested by Great Britain. And from none of the places or possessions thus to be restored was Great Britain to carry away any slave or other property. If this impeachment of our title to or possession of Dauphin island (for which, at an earlier period, Mr. Jackson might have been entitled to the grateful acknowledgments of Spain, but which, at this late day, will hardly be made) had been even colorable, the claim of D’Williers might have presented a fit subject of reference to the arbitrator of the convention. Incontestable as both title and possession were, Mr. Cheves, in consideration of what belonged to the character and dignity of his Government, would not have been without justification if he had declined an arbitration of the question had it been offered by the other Commissioner. In tendering it himself, you cannot fail to perceive manifested by him the greatest moderation and the strongest dispo sition faithfully to execute the fifth article of the convention. Nor can you avoid contrasting the conduct of the two Commissioners in this respect. Whilst Mr. Jackson refuses to refer, to say the least of it, the debatable question of interest, Mr. Cheves is willing to refer a case in which our clear and indisputable right to Dauphin island was the only point to be collaterally adjudicated.
http://www.cnrs-scrn.org/northern_mariner/vol22/tnm_22_361-392.pdf
During this quick withdrawal 222 American slaves joined the British sailors and
army in their retreat to the Gulf of Mexico and re-embarkation.
Slave owners or their agents followed the British to Dauphin Island seeking the return of the Blacks. While 18did return, the Americans found the British less then helpful. In some cases ship masters
stopped the owners from boarding ships. Captains kept the slaves hidden below deck,
while the Blacks still ashore kept inside the tents the British gave them for shelter so as
not to be identified by their former masters. Despite the Treaty of Ghent’s first paragraph,
which required the British to return all property and slaves taken, the British officers
refused to send back any person who did not wish to return. Two hundred and four
American Blacks from New Orleans were sent to Bermuda before being forwarded to
Trinidad.
72
As the American Blacks were taken aboard the British ships Rear-Admiral
Edward Codrington ordered all Blacks, both ex-slaves and troops in the West Indies
Regiment (composed of Black troops), shipped in transports separate from the white
troops, in part to encourage enlistment of the newly freed.
The story, “From Nassau...” appears in the
London Times
, 7 November 1815, Issue 9672, 4,
col. B. Nicolls apparently had negotiated a different arrangement with Blacks who served in
the Colonial Marine Companies he created, dismissing them from service as soon as the war
concluded. The American Blacks from the Chesapeake who entered the Colonial Marines, on
the other hand weren’t discharged until 1816, when the Battalion was disbanded.
110
“Documents Relating to Colonel Edward Nicolls and Captain George Woodbine in
Pensacola, 1814,”
The Florida Historical Society Quarterly
10 no.1 (July, 1931): 51-54, see
53.
111
Sugden, 295.
112
Relacion delos Negros pertenecientes
á
los habitantes dela Plaza Panzacola que se han
fugado y llevado los Ingleses
á
Apalachicola, 4 March 1815, NLS, Cochrane Papers MS
748/73, 77. This and other requests to return Spanish slaves to their masters were rejected by
the British. For example see Cochrane to Manrique, 10 July 1815, Documents Relating to
Colonel..., 52.
113
Kinsman to J. Cockburn, 10 August 1815, TNA, CO 37/73, 58b. Millett, 247-250, His
description of the Blacks serving in the Colonial Marines organized by Nicolls leaves the
reader with the clear impression they were largely from Spanish and Indian masters and that
they stayed in Florida, as free people when the British left.
114
The Memorial of Edward Nicolls, Major Brevet in the Royal Marines to the Honorable Lord
Melville, 5 May 1817, TNA, WO 1/144, 196. On 196a he makes reference to 60 Royal
Marines, 12 Marine Artillery men, 180 Indians and 252 seamen from the squadron who
fought at the first attack on Fort Bower, without mentioning any involvement by Black
force’s.
ochrane had given Nicolls orders to raise a Battalion of Black troops from the
hundreds that they anticipated would flee American slavery when Cochrane’s
proclamation was distributed across the plantations in southern Georgia and the
Mississippi Territory.
106
Some of the Black Americans who had fled slavery before 1814
fought with the British, but as independent fighters much like the Indians; they did not
join a Black battalion.
107
The battalion Nicolls established was constituted largely of Red
Sticks.
108
The issue of how many American Blacks volunteered for military service is
clouded by the tendency that Nicolls and Woodbine had of accepting the requests for
freedom from the slaves of their Indian and Spanish allies. For six months’ military
service any slave it appears could be freed, a local variation on Cochrane’s proclamation.
In one incident George Woodbine took away fourteen slaves requesting refuge from an
ally Indian chief.
109
Nicolls took forty-five slaves from John Innerarity, a Pensacola
resident to serve in the British forces at Prospect Bluff.
110
Woodbine freed so many
Spanish slaves that in 1815 he was arrested for “appropriating slaves.”
111
From Pensacola
and Apalachicola alone, Nicolls and Woodbine freed 665 slaves belonging to the Spanish
between August 1814 and March 1815.
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