THE SITUATION AT MOBILE
To persons abroad and unacquainted with the topography of Mobile Bay, it will be well to explain that Fort Gaines is 29 miles from the city, on the east end of Dauphin Island, and was intended to be one of the defenses of the main entrance to the Bay from the Gulf. Fort Morgan is on the opposite shore. It has always been an object of query that Fort Gaines was built for. Between it and Fort Morgan there is a water expanse of three and a half miles, but the ship channel is on the Fort Morgan side, and every heavy vessel passing is obliged to run within a mile of the guns of Morgan. On the Fort Gaines side of the water is shallow, and no ship could pass within effective range of its guns. When the fleet ran in on Friday, we do not learn that Fort Gaines fired a gun. Fort Powell lies a little to the west and north of Fort Gaines and in the direction of the mainland of the western shore of the Bay. It is built on an artificial island, directly on Grant's Pass, which it was designed to defend- that pass leading into Pascagoula Sound and the lakes in the direction of New Orleans. Fort Powell is about three quarters of a mile from the main land, at Cedar Point, and at low water is fordable. It was by this easy route that its garrison escaped. If there had been no ford, it is possible that Fort Powell would still be in our possession. Fort Morgan still commands the main ship channel to the Gulf, and by this alone Farragut's fleet can get to the sea. He can only bring light vessels and transports through Grant's Pass. Fort Gaines was of no practical value in the defense of the Bay. It adds to the facilities and convenience of the enemy, but was not necessary to his operations. The loss of the garrison is serious but more serious was the manner of its surrender- the stain upon our arms. That is to be wiped out.
With these explanations the stranger will perceive that the line of our city defenses carried by the enemy is from 25 to 30 miles distant from Mobile. It has always been a mooted question among military men whether or not it was wise to hold these points. Many have been in favor of dismantling all the forts in the lower Bay and bringing their guns and garrisons to the inner line nearer the city. The only or the principle reason for the contrary course was found in the importance of keeping possession of the shore of the Bay so as to prevent the enemy from making water base near the city for the advance of an army. The loss of Grant's Pass gives the enemy this advantage. That is, he can now sail up the Bay with his transports loaded with supplies and troops, thus dispensing with wagon trains, and land within a short distance of the city. But when he does this, he has to encounter the inner line of defenses. When he does that he is no nearer to taking Mobile that Grant is to taking Petersburg, Sherman Atlanta or Foster Charleston. In other words, this city is a long ways from "going up". General Canby does not command troops enough to take the city by land, nor Farragut ships to break through the guns and obstructions on the water front.
MOBILE ADVERTISER (reprinted in THE DAILY MONTGOMERY ADVERTISER, Thursday, August 11, 1864)
To persons abroad and unacquainted with the topography of Mobile Bay, it will be well to explain that Fort Gaines is 29 miles from the city, on the east end of Dauphin Island, and was intended to be one of the defenses of the main entrance to the Bay from the Gulf. Fort Morgan is on the opposite shore. It has always been an object of query that Fort Gaines was built for. Between it and Fort Morgan there is a water expanse of three and a half miles, but the ship channel is on the Fort Morgan side, and every heavy vessel passing is obliged to run within a mile of the guns of Morgan. On the Fort Gaines side of the water is shallow, and no ship could pass within effective range of its guns. When the fleet ran in on Friday, we do not learn that Fort Gaines fired a gun. Fort Powell lies a little to the west and north of Fort Gaines and in the direction of the mainland of the western shore of the Bay. It is built on an artificial island, directly on Grant's Pass, which it was designed to defend- that pass leading into Pascagoula Sound and the lakes in the direction of New Orleans. Fort Powell is about three quarters of a mile from the main land, at Cedar Point, and at low water is fordable. It was by this easy route that its garrison escaped. If there had been no ford, it is possible that Fort Powell would still be in our possession. Fort Morgan still commands the main ship channel to the Gulf, and by this alone Farragut's fleet can get to the sea. He can only bring light vessels and transports through Grant's Pass. Fort Gaines was of no practical value in the defense of the Bay. It adds to the facilities and convenience of the enemy, but was not necessary to his operations. The loss of the garrison is serious but more serious was the manner of its surrender- the stain upon our arms. That is to be wiped out.
With these explanations the stranger will perceive that the line of our city defenses carried by the enemy is from 25 to 30 miles distant from Mobile. It has always been a mooted question among military men whether or not it was wise to hold these points. Many have been in favor of dismantling all the forts in the lower Bay and bringing their guns and garrisons to the inner line nearer the city. The only or the principle reason for the contrary course was found in the importance of keeping possession of the shore of the Bay so as to prevent the enemy from making water base near the city for the advance of an army. The loss of Grant's Pass gives the enemy this advantage. That is, he can now sail up the Bay with his transports loaded with supplies and troops, thus dispensing with wagon trains, and land within a short distance of the city. But when he does this, he has to encounter the inner line of defenses. When he does that he is no nearer to taking Mobile that Grant is to taking Petersburg, Sherman Atlanta or Foster Charleston. In other words, this city is a long ways from "going up". General Canby does not command troops enough to take the city by land, nor Farragut ships to break through the guns and obstructions on the water front.
MOBILE ADVERTISER (reprinted in THE DAILY MONTGOMERY ADVERTISER, Thursday, August 11, 1864)
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