JOSEPH GILBERT TOTTEN'S 1851 ANALYSIS OF THE ENEMY THREAT TO MOBILE BAY
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We have another illustration on the gulf, of this action of hostile steamers through shallow channels ; that may be worth adducing : Fort Morgan, at Mobile point, defends very well the main channel into Mobile bay ; and there is no other entrance for sailing vessels of war. But the smaller class of war-steamers would find water enough near the end of Dauphin island; arid, keeping out of reach of> the guns of Fort Morgan, could pass up into the bay. They could, without difficulty, ascend as high as the city of Mobile; and reach that place, moreover, in three hours. A dozen such vessels could, in that short time, carry up, if they were needed, five thousand soldiers. It is' surely not too much to say, therefore,. that Mobile, one of our greatest depots of cotton, is by this new inlet for an enemy's cruisers, much exposed. But this is not all the danger. The large fleet of ships, often one hundred in number, and of the largest class of merchantmen, that lie for months, awaiting their cargoes in the lower part of .the bay, are within an hour's run of such steamers from the open gulf; and might be destroyed, either by the same expedition that ascends to Mobile, or by one sent in for that particular purpose. .
For this, and other serious consequences of leaving open this entrance to Mobile bay, the sure and the cheap remedy is the placing a small fort at the east end of Dauphin island, a work already wisely ordered, by Congress. When it is said in general, that the light draught of these vessels opens avenues of attack before defended by nature, it must not be supposed that therefore it is part of the system of defense to fortify all shallow channels. Whether shallow passages will require defenses or not, will depend entirely on the importance of the objects to which they give access ; and the power of the attack that may be directed through them ; and not at all on the circumstance that an enemy's steamers may enter them without difficulty. There are a great many entrances and harbors on the coast, not shoal harbors merely, but many affording water enough for the largest vessels, — that will require, if any, no other defences than such as can be prepared in time of war, because there are no objects upon these waters of a nature to provoke the cupidity of hostile cruisers ; having nothing to lose in this way, they will have nothing to fear. The shallow and difficult avenues to great and valuable objects are those, for which we have to provide defences in addition to defences that were necessary before the introduction of war- steamers. The danger of the Hell-gate passage to New York, sufficed to keep any man-of-war from attempting to sail through ; but it proves to be no impediment to steamers. The " Broad Sound" channel and also the " Gut" ' channel into Boston harbor, are easy tracks for large steamers, though next to impracticable to line-of-battle ships and frigates ; and so with other channels and other places. In considering to what extent the introduction of steamers into war service, may help the coast defence of the country, should we- assume that we ought to rely upon them to repel the enemy's steamers, so dangerous in coming without warning, and penetrating promptly through all natural obstacles up to the vital points of the coast, we should commit a very great error; though it is perhaps a natural one, on a cursory examination, — as it certainly 'is a frequent one. It would be a fatal error if practised upon by a nation having more than one or two important ports, and even with, such nation, it would be the most expensive of all resorts.
This cannot be a safe reliance with war steamers any more than with sailing vessels of war, and a few words may make this clear.
I do not assert that armed vessels would not be useful in coast defence. .Such an idea would be absurd : I shall even have occasion to show a necessity for this kind of force in certain exceptional cases. It is the general proposition, viz : that armed vessels, and not fortifications, are the proper defences for our vulnerable points, — a proposition the more dangerous, because seemingly in such accordance with the well-tried prowess and heroic achievements of the navy — that we have now to controvert.
Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Charleston and New Orleans, are, we will suppose, to be guarded, not by forts, but by these vessels, on the occurrence of a war with a nation possessing large naval means. We know that it is no effort for such nations to despatch a fleet of twenty ; line-of-battle ships and frigates ; or an equal number of war steamers ; or even the combined mass ; both fleets in one.
The United Service Journal shows that in the month of August last, Great Britain had actually in commission in their navy, in a time of pro found peace, thirty-eight line-of-battle ships and frigates, thirteen sloops-of- war, and upwards of fiffty smaller armed sailing vessels, together with forty- eight armed war-steamers and near forty unarmed steamers.
What then shall we do, at the above named ports, severally ?
Perdido Bay. — This bay is intimately related to Pensacola and Mobile bays, both as regards security and intercommunication, and should be care fully surveyed with a view to those objects. It must be fortified, and the cost may be $200,000. (Class F.)
Mobile Bay. — The plan of defence for this bay requires a fort on Mobile Point, and another on Dauphin Island.
Fort Morgan, at the first mentioned position, is a finished work, in an efficient condition ; but requiring, in the way of barracks and quarters, store-houses, &c, for the accommodation of its garrison, some further expenditures. These improvements are in progress, — estimated at $30,000. (Class B.)
Fort Gaines, on Dauphin Island — has been authorized by Congress, and the expenditure of the appropriation awaits only the settlement of title to the site, — as to which there are supposed to be no remaining difficulties, — estimate, $180,000. (Class C.)
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We have another illustration on the gulf, of this action of hostile steamers through shallow channels ; that may be worth adducing : Fort Morgan, at Mobile point, defends very well the main channel into Mobile bay ; and there is no other entrance for sailing vessels of war. But the smaller class of war-steamers would find water enough near the end of Dauphin island; arid, keeping out of reach of> the guns of Fort Morgan, could pass up into the bay. They could, without difficulty, ascend as high as the city of Mobile; and reach that place, moreover, in three hours. A dozen such vessels could, in that short time, carry up, if they were needed, five thousand soldiers. It is' surely not too much to say, therefore,. that Mobile, one of our greatest depots of cotton, is by this new inlet for an enemy's cruisers, much exposed. But this is not all the danger. The large fleet of ships, often one hundred in number, and of the largest class of merchantmen, that lie for months, awaiting their cargoes in the lower part of .the bay, are within an hour's run of such steamers from the open gulf; and might be destroyed, either by the same expedition that ascends to Mobile, or by one sent in for that particular purpose. .
For this, and other serious consequences of leaving open this entrance to Mobile bay, the sure and the cheap remedy is the placing a small fort at the east end of Dauphin island, a work already wisely ordered, by Congress. When it is said in general, that the light draught of these vessels opens avenues of attack before defended by nature, it must not be supposed that therefore it is part of the system of defense to fortify all shallow channels. Whether shallow passages will require defenses or not, will depend entirely on the importance of the objects to which they give access ; and the power of the attack that may be directed through them ; and not at all on the circumstance that an enemy's steamers may enter them without difficulty. There are a great many entrances and harbors on the coast, not shoal harbors merely, but many affording water enough for the largest vessels, — that will require, if any, no other defences than such as can be prepared in time of war, because there are no objects upon these waters of a nature to provoke the cupidity of hostile cruisers ; having nothing to lose in this way, they will have nothing to fear. The shallow and difficult avenues to great and valuable objects are those, for which we have to provide defences in addition to defences that were necessary before the introduction of war- steamers. The danger of the Hell-gate passage to New York, sufficed to keep any man-of-war from attempting to sail through ; but it proves to be no impediment to steamers. The " Broad Sound" channel and also the " Gut" ' channel into Boston harbor, are easy tracks for large steamers, though next to impracticable to line-of-battle ships and frigates ; and so with other channels and other places. In considering to what extent the introduction of steamers into war service, may help the coast defence of the country, should we- assume that we ought to rely upon them to repel the enemy's steamers, so dangerous in coming without warning, and penetrating promptly through all natural obstacles up to the vital points of the coast, we should commit a very great error; though it is perhaps a natural one, on a cursory examination, — as it certainly 'is a frequent one. It would be a fatal error if practised upon by a nation having more than one or two important ports, and even with, such nation, it would be the most expensive of all resorts.
This cannot be a safe reliance with war steamers any more than with sailing vessels of war, and a few words may make this clear.
I do not assert that armed vessels would not be useful in coast defence. .Such an idea would be absurd : I shall even have occasion to show a necessity for this kind of force in certain exceptional cases. It is the general proposition, viz : that armed vessels, and not fortifications, are the proper defences for our vulnerable points, — a proposition the more dangerous, because seemingly in such accordance with the well-tried prowess and heroic achievements of the navy — that we have now to controvert.
Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Charleston and New Orleans, are, we will suppose, to be guarded, not by forts, but by these vessels, on the occurrence of a war with a nation possessing large naval means. We know that it is no effort for such nations to despatch a fleet of twenty ; line-of-battle ships and frigates ; or an equal number of war steamers ; or even the combined mass ; both fleets in one.
The United Service Journal shows that in the month of August last, Great Britain had actually in commission in their navy, in a time of pro found peace, thirty-eight line-of-battle ships and frigates, thirteen sloops-of- war, and upwards of fiffty smaller armed sailing vessels, together with forty- eight armed war-steamers and near forty unarmed steamers.
What then shall we do, at the above named ports, severally ?
Perdido Bay. — This bay is intimately related to Pensacola and Mobile bays, both as regards security and intercommunication, and should be care fully surveyed with a view to those objects. It must be fortified, and the cost may be $200,000. (Class F.)
Mobile Bay. — The plan of defence for this bay requires a fort on Mobile Point, and another on Dauphin Island.
Fort Morgan, at the first mentioned position, is a finished work, in an efficient condition ; but requiring, in the way of barracks and quarters, store-houses, &c, for the accommodation of its garrison, some further expenditures. These improvements are in progress, — estimated at $30,000. (Class B.)
Fort Gaines, on Dauphin Island — has been authorized by Congress, and the expenditure of the appropriation awaits only the settlement of title to the site, — as to which there are supposed to be no remaining difficulties, — estimate, $180,000. (Class C.)
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