This week's Dauphin Island history post is a portion of an 1822 U.S. House of Representatives' Committee on Military Affairs' investigation into the potential fortification of Mobile Bay and the map which was used to make their conclusion which was that THERE WAS NO JUSTIFICATION FOR FORTIFYING DAUPHIN ISLAND.
The map in this post is not the original one used by the Congress in 1822 but it is based up the original drawn by Mobilian Curtis Lewis in 1820. The posted map was published in 1896 by Alabama native, William Trent Rossell.
Not only did Curtis Lewis map Mobile Bay in 1820 but he also had some other strong ties to Dauphin Island. His wife was the granddaughter of Major Robert Farmar, namesake for D.I.'s Major Farmar Street. At the time Lewis produced his map, his wife's family's estate had filed a private claim with the United States for ownership of Dauphin Island based upon a deed obtained by Major Farmar in the 1760s. Lewis' father-in-law, Louis de Vaubercey, who married Farmar's 2nd child, Mary Elizabeth
http://www.findagrave.com/cgi-bin/fg.cgi?page=gr&GRid=12835704, established a lime kiln on D.I. in the early 19th century using the Indian shell mounds as raw material to produce mortar. Vaubercey died on Dauphin Island on April 10, 1837.
https://books.google.com/books?id=Y5YbAQAAMAAJ&pg=PA345&lpg=PA345&dq=%22mobile+bay%22+%22military+affairs%22+february+28,+1822&source=bl&ots=A87EJGfmmJ&sig=LXq5ZsjjvTJe2zaH3Y93xIgF2hY&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjk_6e9qMPNAhXHeCYKHfTRCKcQ6AEIJDAB#v=onepage&q=%22mobile%20bay%22%20%22military%20affairs%22%20february%2028%2C%201822&f=false
https://books.google.com/books?id=Y5YbAQAAMAAJ&pg=PA388&lpg=PA388&dq=%22curtis+lewis%22+%22mobile+bay%22+eustis+%22house+of+representatives%22&source=bl&ots=A87EJGejoE&sig=0OZQX8t5hUcMSdkP8rAzuB8nvDc&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiS1O_Yo8PNAhVBPiYKHcO5C84Q6AEIHjAA#v=onepage&q=%22curtis%20lewis%22%20%22mobile%20bay%22%20eustis%20%22house%20of%20representatives%22&f=false
"The report of the engineers states that the object of forts on Mobile
Point, and on the eastern point of Dauphin Island, is to prevent the
enemy from occupying them as places of refuge, to prevent the mouths of
the river from being blockaded, to secure the communication between New
Orleans and Mobile Bay.
The fort on Dauphin Island is intended to defend the western channel,
which they state to be one mile distant, and having a depth of water of
ten feet according to their chart, and seven feet according to Lewis,
through which vessels constructed for the purpose, and drawing from
eight to nine feet water, and mounting twelve or fifteen guns, might
enter the bay. It will also, they add, deprive the enemy's vessels of
the anchorage under Pelican Island, which anchorage they state to be fit
for vessels drawing seventeen or eighteen feet water — that is to say,
sloops of war. It will also, as they say, prevent an enemy from
establishing himself on Dauphin Island, by cutting a communication
between Lake Pontchartrain and Mobile Bay, while the fort will serve as a
depot for naval stores, and for the stores and armament necessary for
the protection of the coasting trade.
The committee have given these subjects due consideration, and have also
considered Dauphin Island in all its bearings and relations, and cannot
believe them of sufficient importance to justify an expenditure of a
million of dollars, which the work on Dauphin Island, with its ordnance
and necessary fixtures, will probably require, without taking into view
the subsequent expenses incident thereto.
Would a fort on Dauphin Island effect the object contemplated by the
engineers? The committee conceive that it could not. It is too far
distant from the ship channel to aid in preventing a blockade; nor can
the fort on Mobile Point, although near to the channel, entirely effect
it. A single sloop of war lying at anchor within the bar, three miles
distant from the fort, or in the bay, out of gunshot of the fort, would
effectually blockade the bay with out being exposed to danger from
either fort.
Will a fort on Dauphin Island protect the coasting trade from New
Orleans? Certainly it cannot. The channel for coasting vessels has from
four to five feet water, and is at least four miles distant from the
site of the fort on Dauphin Island. The coasting trade cannot, of
course, receive protection from any force placed there.
Would a fort on Dauphin Island be able to deprive an enemy of anchorage
under Pelican Island? A sloop of war might anchor under that island, if
the engineers' chart be correct, and might remain there. She would then
be thirty-five miles distant from Mobile, and could approach no nearer;
for the western channel has only ten feet water according to the
engineers' chart, and but seven according to Lewis's. The chart last
mentioned, and that from the Navy Office, give only eleven and twelve
feet water to the entrance; to the anchorage under Pelican Island, of
course, not even a sloop of war can enter, if these charts be correct.
It is alleged that vessels drawing eight or nine feet water, and
mounting ten or twelve guns, may pass through the western channel. If
Lewis's chart be correct, they cannot; if that of the engineers be
correct, they may. Such vessels may, however, pass more conveniently in
the night, in the ship channel, in deep water, and make their
arrangements at their leisure for an attack on the city of Mobile or
Blakely in the bay, and out of gunshot of the fort.
The engineers say 'that the western channel being one mile from the site
of the fort on Dauphin Island, such vessels would pass with very little
annoyance from the shot of the fort, and that they can be prevented in
no way but by a floating force;' from whence it follows that the immense
fortification contemplated on this island could not have the effect of
preventing such vessels from entering the bay. The anchorage under
Pelican Island may be entered, agreeably to the engineers' chart, by
vessels drawing 17 or 18 feet water; but according to the chart of the
Navy Commissioners, and that of Lewis taken in 1820, there are only 11
or 12 feet of water; and if these be correct, even sloops of war cannot
enter. Vessels drawing only 8 or 9 feet water, and mounting 12 or 15
guns, must, as your committee apprehend, be built for the occasion. The
steam frigate and gun-boats herein recommended would, in the opinion of
the committee, prove a more effectual security against an enemy entering
the bay than the 108 guns proposed to be mounted on the land.
The objection to the occupation of Dauphin Island by an enemy, and to
his making an establishment there, from whence to cut off the coasting
trade between New Orleans and Mobile, consists in this: the water is not
sufficiently deep for him to be protected by his fleet, while his
object may be much better accomplished by taking possession of Cat
Island, thirty miles distant from Lake Pontchartrain, and about fifty
miles from the east end of Dauphin Island, where large ships of war may
lie in safety, and from whence he may completely intercept their (trade.
A single sloop of war stationed at Cat or Ship Island would destroy
their trade, without risk, unless prevented by a superior naval force.
The fort on Dauphin Island cannot be made use of as a depot of naval
stores, or armament for defense of the coasting trade, because the depth
of water for nearly a mile distant from the shore will not admit our
smallest vessels. Should such a place of deposit be deemed necessary,
Mobile Point is in every respect preferable. The harbor near the Point
is good, and the water sufficiently deep for vessels to anchor near it,
and to discharge their cargoes with facility.
From the best view which the committee have been able to take of the
subject, it appears to them that the fortification on Dauphin Island,
calculated to contain 108 guns, ought to be discontinued; that an
enclosed work on Mobile Point, calculated to mount fifty or sixty pieces
of heavy ordnance, with an adequate floating force, and twenty or
thirty pieces (say twelve, eighteen, and twenty-four pounders) mounted
and deposited in an arsenal to be erected for that purpose at Mobile or
Blakely, from whence they may be detached, as occasion might require, to
the points of land by which the boats or barges of an enemy must
necessarily pass in his approach to either of those places, and to cover
the floating force in case of retreat, would constitute a suitable
defense for the bay of Mobile.
All which is respectfully submitted.
Statement of distances— Dauphin Island.
Distance from Dauphin Island to Mobile Point,
On the large map, - - - - - - - -3 miles.
On engineers' chart, - - - - - - - 3 and one third miles
On Lewis's marine chart, - - - - - - -4 miles
Distance from the same to the ship channel,
On large map, - - - - - - - -2 and one half miles
On engineers' chart, - - - - - - - - 2 and one half miles
On Lewis's chart, - - - - - - - - 2 and one half miles
Distance from the fort on Dauphin Island to Pelican Island,
On large map, (not given.)
On engineers' chart, - - - - - - - -2 and one quarter miles
On Lewis's chart, - - - - - - - - 4 miles
Distance from fort on Dauphin Island to Passe au Heron, or coasting channel,
On large map, - - - - - - - - 3 and one quarter miles
On engineers' chart, - - - - - - - 3 and one half miles
On Lewis's chart, - - - - - - - -7 miles
Depth of water on the bar,
Large chart, - - - - - - - -18 feet.
Engineers' chart, - - - - - - - -18 feet
Lewis's chart, - - - - - - - -16 feet
Channel near Dauphin Island,
Large chart, - - - - - - - -12 feet
Engineers', - - - - - - - -10 feet
Lewis's, 12 feet, with a pass of only - - . - - - - 7 feet
Entrance to get under Pelican Island,
Large chart, - - - - - - - -12 feet
Engineers', - - - - - - - -18 feet
Lewis's, - - - - - - - - -11 feet
Passe au Heron, or coasting channel,
Large chart, - - - - - - - -5 feet
Engineers' not given.
Lewis's, - - - - - - - - -4 feet
Distance from Mobile Point to the city of Mobile, in a straight line,
Large chart, - - - - - - - -35 miles.
Lewis's, - -'- - - - - - -33 miles
Distance from 18 feet water to the city,
Large chart, - - - - - - - -28 miles
Lewis's, - - -, - - - - -26 miles
Distance from 14 feet water,
Large chart, - - - - - - - -15 miles
Lewis's, - - -' - - - - - - 13 and one half miles
Distance from 10 feet water,
Large chart, - - - .- - - - -3 and one half miles
Lewis's, - - - - - - - - -6 miles
Depth of water, - - - - - - 7 feet.
Pass or channel from the anchorage under Pelican Island to the ship channel, - - - 9 feet.
Pass or channel from the same, to proceed direct to the city of Mobile, - - - 7 feet
Distance from Ship Island to the main, Large chart, - - - - - - - -6 miles.
From Cat river, - - - - - - - 7 and one half miles
Depth of water near those islands, - - - - - - 21 to 24 feet.
Distance from 18 feet water, near Cat Island,
To Bienvenue, - - - - - - - -35 miles.
From same to the pass Rigolets, - - - - - - 20 miles
Distance from Dauphin Island to the Rigolets - - - - - - 9
Washington, April 8, 1820.
Colonel:
I have the honor of submitting to you, as you require, the motives which
determined the board to propose occupying the eastern point of Dauphin
Island by a fort of the same importance and dimensions as that which has
been projected at Mobile Point.
In the report presented by the board (1818) on the defense of the
frontier of the Union, on the Gulf of Mexico, the following
considerations are those which determined us to defend the entrance of
Mobile Bay: 1st, To prevent the enemy from occupying it as a port of
refuge, from whence he might act against the other parts of the
frontier; (a consideration which would become of still greater
importance, if, in consequence of the acquisition of Florida, Pensacola
became a naval depot and harbor of rendezvous.) 2d, To prevent the
mouths of the navigable rivers which fall into this bay from being
blockaded, which in time of war would cut off the State of Alabama (and
all the new States to be formed hereafter on that frontier) from all
communication with the ocean; and, when on this subject, we shall
observe that the communication between the Tennessee and the ocean will
hereafter take place through Mobile Bay by artificial canals. 3d, To
secure the communication between New Orleans and Mobile bay by Lake
Pontchartrain, and the little interior sea comprised between the main
and the chain of islands bounded by Cat Island to the west, and Dauphin
Island to the east.
Upon these principles we must conclude that it is not sufficient to
close the entrance into Mobile bay, but that we must prevent it from
being blockaded, as well as localities will allow.
The entrance into the bay between Dauphin Island and Mobile Point is
from three to three and a half miles wide, and has two channels of
entry. The eastern and principal channel is one mile wide opposite
Mobile Point, and is crossed, three miles below, and to the south of it,
by a bar which has only from seventeen to eighteen feet of water at
full tide. The western channel passes at one thousand two hundred yards'
distance from the eastern point of Dauphin Island; its breadth is about
three hundred yards, and it is about ten feet deep; the eastern or
farther side of this channel is thus at the same distance (one mile)
from Dauphin Island as the western or further side of the main channel
is from Mobile Point. This breadth (one mile) is rather too great to be
very effectually or strongly defended by land batteries above; the board
have, therefore, recommended, in time of war, to defend these channels
by a division of gun-boats acting in concert with the forts supported by
and supporting them.
The first object of the fort projected on the eastern point of Dauphin
Island is thus to batter the western channel, where vessels constructed
for that purpose, drawing from eight to nine feet of water, and carrying
from twelve to fifteen guns, might penetrate into the bay. But it also
satisfies to many other important conditions. 1st. It will deprive the
enemy of the anchorage north of Pelican Island, and three hundred yards
south of Dauphin Island, and secure it to the navy of the Union. This
anchorage is fit for ships drawing from seventeen to eighteen feet, and
if it were in the enemy's possession, it would afford him every facility
for blockading the bay, or penetrating into the western channel. The
fort will protect this anchorage, partly by its own fire, and partly by
the fire of batteries erected in time of war under its protection. 2d.
Occupying the eastern point of Dauphin Island, this fort forms a kind of
tete du pont, by which troops may at all times be thrown into
the island, to prevent an enemy from establishing himself in it, and
cutting off the communications, mentioned above, between Lake
Pontchartrain and Mobile bay. 3d. This fort, to the east point of
Dauphin Island, will serve as a depot of all the means and stores of
armament, ammunitions, and provisions, necessary to act with the navy;
and defend, by temporary batteries, the several passes between the
islands above mentioned, which cover the interior channel of navigation,
uniting New Orleans, by Lake Pontchartrain, with Mobile bay.
As to the dimensions of the fort to be established on the eastern point
of Dauphin Island, if we consider that it will have a passage to defend
of the same breadth as the passage defended by the fort on Mobile Point;
that it must, moreover, bear fires upon the anchorage south of the
island; that it lies more distant from succors than Mobile Point; and
that, in time of war, it must serve as a depot for the stores and
armament necessary for the protection of the coasting trade and
navigation to the west of the bay, we must conclude that its strength
and dimensions can not be made inferior to those of the fort projected
at Mobile Point.
I have the honor to remain, colonel, very respectfully, your most obedient humble servant,
BERNARD, Brig. Gen.
To Colonel W. K; Armistead, Chief Engineer. Engineer Department.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Walker_Keith_Armistead
A true copy. J. L. SMITH, Lieutenant Engineers.
Washington, April 10, 1820.
Colonel:
I have the honor of transmitting to you the motives for which, in my
opinion, the fort projected by the board to occupy Mobile Point cannot
be reduced in its dimensions, without interfering with its objects.
You will find, in the report presented by the board, (1818,) that
fifty-four pieces of the armament of the fort were destined to batter on
the sea side, and an equal number on the land side. But fifty-four
pieces are not too many to defend a channel of nearly one mile in
breadth, and of depth sufficient to admit vessels drawing fifteen feet;
and that number of guns, as well as the dimensions of the fort, would
have been augmented, if the board had not taken into consideration that
it was purposed to strengthen the defense of the channel by gun-boats
acting in co-operation with the forts.
By land, the fort is exposed to a regular attack on every side. It was,
therefore, necessary to give it sufficient means of defense, to allow
time for succors to arrive before it could be taken. If we consider that
on this frontier the population is widely scattered, we must conclude
that a longer time will be necessary to assemble the militia there than
on other points, and that the fort must be constructed with sufficient
strength to resist an invading enemy, until it can be relieved.
I shall only add one consideration to those which I have exposed before.
If, in consequence of the acquisition of the Floridas, Pensacola become
a naval depot and a harbor of rendezvous, Mobile Bay would be a most
favorable place of arms for an enemy to operate from thence upon the
naval establishments of Pensacola.
These motives, joined to those which I have had the honor of addressing
to you on the 8th instant, have brought complete conviction (at least to
my mind) that the forts projected by the board at Dauphin Island and
Mobile Point cannot be diminished in their dimensions without exposing
that important position to be insufficiently defended.
I have the honor,
Sec. BERNARD, Brig. Gen.
To Colonel W. K. Armistead, Chief Engineer.
A true copy: J. L. SMITH, Lieutenant Corps of Engineers.
